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EMERGING PRACTICES IN COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS
Jennifer Loutit*
Jacqueline Mandelbaum**
Sam Szoke-Burke***
ABSTRACT
Community Development Agreements (CDAs) have the potential to facilitate
the delivery of tangible benefits from large-scale investment projects, such as
mines or forestry concessions, to affected persons and communities. To be
effective, however, CDAs must be adapted to the local context, meaning that
no single model agreement or process will be appropriate in every situation.
Nonetheless, leading practices are emerging which can be required by
governments, voluntarily adopted by companies, and demanded by
communities. These practices are grounded in ensuring that all parties are
sufficiently informed, capacitated, and prepared to engage in meaningful
negotiations regarding how the investor’s operations should benefit local
stakeholders. This article reviews existing research on CDAs, as well as
available agreements from the extractive sector in Australia, Canada, Laos,
Papua New Guinea, Ghana and Greenland. It articulates seven broad leading
practices and how different stakeholders could work to achieve more effective
agreements.
Keywords: Community development agreement, extractive, investment,
leading practices.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A Community Development Agreement (CDA)1 has the potential to facilitate
the delivery of tangible benefits from large-scale investment projects, such as
mines or forestry concessions, to affected communities and individuals. In
formalising agreements between an investor company and one or more
communities affected by that company’s projects, CDAs set out how the benefits
of an investment project are intended to be shared with local communities.
CDAs are becoming more and more common, and stand as an important
opportunity for ensuring the self-determined development of local communities.
This article seeks to identify leading practices from past CDA negotiations
that increase the likelihood that a CDA will translate into lasting benefits for
those affected.
The article focuses on practices that companies and communities can
institute, but may also be of relevance to governments, who can encourage
investors to adopt good practices and, in some cases, mandate such practices
through legislation or regulation. Indeed, in some instances, governments
are also signatories to a CDA, and can thus influence how negotiations proceed.
The role of governments is especially important where local communities
lack capacity or sufficient resources to represent their position effectively.
Governments can exert considerable influence over how companies engage
with communities through stipulations in applicable legislation or investorstate agreements establishing investment projects.
Part 2 of this article contextualises CDAs and explains what is meant by
“leading practices.” The article then roughly maps out the agreement-making
process in Part 3, before identifying and explaining seven leading practices in
Part 4. Part five is the conclusion.
2. IDENTIFYING LEADING PRACTICES
The authors sought to identify practices relating to both the content of CDAs
and the processes used to arrive at agreement.2 Among other factors, the vast
1

2

The “term community development agreement” (or CDA) is used in this article
to describe all agreements between communities and the extractive industry
companies with the similar goals of promoting community development. These
are also sometimes referred to as “community benefit agreements”, “impact
benefit agreements,” or “social agreements.” For a longer list of terms that are
also used to describe such agreements, see Box 2.1 in World Bank, “Mining
Community Development Agreements: Source Book,” (March, 2012), p. 5.
A summary of key points in the CDAs reviewed is available at the Columbia
Centre on Sustainable Investment’s Community Development Agreements
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differences between communities, companies, geographical locations and
regulatory contexts make it difficult to identify “best practice” or model CDAs
that will always be appropriate. In addition, many agreements contain
provisions that render part or all of the agreement confidential, which limits
the ability of researchers to obtain the full text of agreements, and identify
other trends of predominant practices. For these reasons, this article focuses
on leading practices discoverable from a review of publicly available CDAs.3
It also examines existing tools, research and analysis regardingcertain
agreements and case studies in the extractives sector.4
This article also refers to legislative requirements governing the creation
of CDAs in particular countries. It focuses on Australia’s legislative regime

3

4

webpage: http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/05/Final-Matrix-CDA-April2015.xls. The review broke down the benefits provided to communities into
nine broad categories: financial, infrastructure, employment, training, business
development, education, community welfare projects, cultural programmes,
and mine closure and rehabilitation plans. These categories are intended to
form umbrellas for a wide range of highly specific benefits. They describe the
overarching goals of the many different benefits provided in both the CDAs
reviewed and those discussed and referred to in toolkits and reports.
Those that were identified in the review for this brief were from Australia,
Canada, Papua New Guinea, Ghana, Laos and Greenland. Out of these, Ghana
and Laos do not have a legislative or constitutional requirement to negotiate
with impacted, local communities. Full text versions of CDAs are available from
CCSI’s website (http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/communitydevelopment-agreements-frameworks-and-tools/), from the Agreements,
Treaties and Negotiated Settlements website (http://www.atns.net.au/
browse.asp) and the CDA Library maintained by Sustainable Development
Strategies Group (SDSG) (http://www.sdsg.org/archives/cda-library/).
InterGroup Consultants, “Aboriginal Engagement in Resource Development
Industry Leading Practices,” (October, 2008); Indigenous Support Services,
“Agreements between Mining Companies and Indigenous Communities: A Report
to the Australian Minerals and Energy Environment Foundation,” (December,
2001); Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, “Agreement-making with
Indigenous Groups: Oil & Gas Development, Australia,” (2012); Ginger Gibson
and Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, “IBA Community Toolkit: Negotiation and
Implementation of Impact and Benefit Agreements,” (March, 2010); International
Council on Mining & Metals, “Community Development Toolkit,” (2012);
International Council on Mining & Metals, “Good Practice Guide: Indigenous
Peoples and Mining,” (2010); International Finance Corporation, “Stakeholder
Engagement: A Good Practice Handbook for Companies Doing Business in
Emerging Markets,” (2007); Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, “World
Bank Extractive Industries Sourcebook: Good Practice Notes,” (March, 2012);
World Bank, “Mining Community Development Agreements: Source Book,”
(March, 2012), Community Development Agreement Model Regulations & Example
Guidelines, (World Bank Group, Final Report, submitted by James M. Otto, 2011).

2016

EMERGING PRACTICES IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS

67

for CDAs, as a majority of the agreements reviewed were Australian. The
Australian government bears a legal duty to negotiate and/or consult with
stakeholders in certain contexts.5 However, the obligations attached to this
governmental duty are broadly framed and generally only apply to land where
certain formal tenure rights, specifically, native title rights, are held or claimed
by indigenous peoples. This has helped spur on leading practices by companies.
Indeed, the CDA practices of some companies operating in countries requiring
CDAs – generally companies with considerable size and experience, and who
have internal mandates promoting meaningful community engagement – often
go beyond such mandatory requirements.6
Before exploring the agreement-making process, it is necessary to consider
the rights of indigenous peoples at international law, which inform many
leading practices in community engagement and CDAs. Indigenous peoples
are often some of the world’s most disadvantaged societal groups and have
successfully campaigned for an international regime of rights that extends
beyond universal human rights protections.7 One of the most significant of
these protections is the principle of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC).8
The requirement to obtain an indigenous community’s FPIC obliges
governments and, where relevant, companies to ensure that indigenous
communities agreeing to a project are adequately informed of the project’s
likely positive and negative impacts, and are providing their consent free
from any pressure or interference and prior to the commencement of the

5
6

7

8

See, e.g., Australia’s Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), s 25; Gibson and O’Faircheallaigh,
2010, op. cit., p. 30. Canada’s laws contain a similar requirement, which may be
satisfied by an agreement between company and community.
For example, the Argyle Diamond Mines Agreement in Australia (2004-2005)
and the Raglan Agreement in Northern Quebec, Canada (1995) are widely
considered to be some of the most innovative CDA examples more than 10 years
on: Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, “Agreement-making with
Indigenous Groups: Oil & Gas Development, Australia,” 2012, op. cit., p. 21;
International Council on Mining & Metals, 2010, op. cit., p. 65.
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP);
International Labour Organisation, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention,
1989 (No. 169). See also International Finance Corporation, “Performance
Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability” (January, 2012).
UNDRIP Article 32(2) provides that “States shall consult and cooperate in good
faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative
institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the
approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources,
particularly in connection with the development, utilisation or exploitation of
mineral, water or other resources”.
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project. Consultations with indigenous peoples should, therefore, be carried
out with the object of obtaining the community’s consent.9 Communities should
also be able to effectively participate in the project approval process, which
may include negotiating a CDA.
International best practices dictate that consultations and negotiations
with non-indigenous communities should also be guided by the principles of
FPIC,10 even where the government or the company may not be required to do
so under domestic or international law. The United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has also urged various states to accord
rights to informed consent to non-indigenous communities affected by
extractives projects11 and other projects requiring their relocation.12 Companies

9

International Labour Organisation, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention,
1989 (No. 169), Art. 6(2).
10 See, e.g., China Chamber of Commerce and Metals Minerals and Chemicals
Importers and Exporters, Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining
Investments, http://www.srz.com/files/upload/Conflict_Minerals_Resource_
Center/CCCMC_Guidelines_for_Social_Responsibility_in_Outbound_ Mining_
Operations_English_Version.pdf, Art. 2.4.5 (calling on companies to “[p]rotect
the rights for free, prior and informed consent of local communities including
indigenous peoples”). In other sectors, see, e.g., Roundtable on Sustainable
Palm Oil, Principles and Criteria for the Production of Sustainable Palm Oil (2013),
Principle 2.3 (“Use of the land for oil palm does not diminish the legal, customary
or user rights of other users without their free, prior and informed consent”);
Forestry Stewardship Council, FSC Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship,
para. 2.2. (Local communities with legal or customary tenure or use rights shall
maintain control, to the extent necessary to protect their rights or resources,
over forest operations unless they delegate control with free and informed
consent to other agencies.)
11 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on
the initial report of Mauritania, adopted by the Committee at its forty-ninth session
(12-30 November 2012) (December 10, 2012), UN Doc. E/C.12/MRT/CO/1,
para. 8 (“The Committee calls on the State party to … ensure that the free, prior
and informed consent of thepopulation is obtained in decision-making processes
on extractive and mining projectsaffecting them”).
12 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Consideration of reports
submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - Mexico,
UN Doc. E/C.12/MEX/CO/4, June 9, 2006 para. 28 (“The Committee urges the
State party to ensure that the indigenous and local communities affected by the
La Parota Hydroelectric Dam Project or other large-scale projects on the lands
and territories which they own or traditionally occupy or use are duly consulted,
and that their prior informed consent is sought, in any decision-making processes
related to these projects affecting their rights and interests under the Covenant”);
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on
the third periodic report of Azerbaijan, adopted by the Committee at its fiftieth
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should, therefore, ensure that they engage in meaningful consultation with
communities by affording them the information and resources necessary to
effectively negotiate an agreement that meets their needs and priorities.
3. THE AGREEMENT-MAKING PROCESS
The agreement-making process for CDAs varies with each agreement but can
be broken down roughly into three stages. In practice, these stages may be
conflated or overlap, or occur in a slightly different order. First, the prenegotiation stage involves the company and the community or communities
laying the groundwork for negotiations. This may include precursor agreements
such as a memorandum of understanding (MOU) or a negotiating framework,
each of which set out rules to govern the process for negotiating the CDA.
Second, the research and consultation stage incorporates stakeholder
mapping to determine who stands to be affected by the project, as well as
impact assessments, such as Environmental and Social Impact Assessments
(ESIAs), which are often legally mandated, and Human Rights Impact
Assessments (HRIAs). During this stage the company or government should
provide capacity building, to ensure community agency and ownership of the
process, and education about the proposed project to communities that stand
to be affected. Third, no agreement can be concluded without the actual
negotiation process and endorsement of the final agreement. Once the
agreement-making process has been concluded, monitoring and implementing
the agreement then becomes a key focus to ensure that parties comply with
obligations, and that the promised benefits are transferred to community
parties.
Many of the agreements reviewed do not provide details regarding the
first and second stages of the agreement-making process. The leading practices
discussed below relating to these stages, therefore, rely largely on secondary
literature and analysis. In addition, the review did not include an examination
of how the CDAs operate in practice. Further research is needed to understand
the impact that terms of the agreements can have in practice, and to identify
additional leading practices that can be effectively included in future CDAs.

session (29 April-17 May 2013) (June 5, 2013), UN Doc. E/C.12/AZE/CO/3,
para. 22 (“The Committee also urges the State party to ensure that any relocation
of homes necessary for city renewal is carried out with prior consultations among
affected households, with their informed consent and with full respect to the
safety and dignity of people following an adequate and transparent procedure.”).
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4. LEADING PRACTICES
It should be noted that the concept of a leading practice is relative; the practices
of a leading company may be better than other companies, but this does not
necessarily mean that they are always rights-compliant or constitute a “gold
standard” of practice. More may be required at each stage, depending on the
laws in force and the likely extent of impacts on the rights of community
members and other individuals. The analysis was also conducted on the basis
that the prevalence of a particular practice or clause does not necessarily
denote that such a practice or clause is desirable or recommended.
The leading practices are as follows:
4.1 Conduct Extensive Research and Consult Widely to
Identify all Communities, and the Individuals who Will
Represent Them, in the CDA Negotiation Process
Determining which communities to engage with is a complex but crucial
aspect of the CDA negotiating process. Various types of groups may need to
be considered. Communities that have a recognised legal right to land within
or near the proposed project area may be able to enforce a right to consultation
or consent, or to benefit sharing, based on the country’s laws. Another category
of potential parties to the CDA is any other proximate communities and
individuals that, while not formally recognised as having legal title over the
land, may also stand to be adversely affected by the project. A third category
concerns communities that are not located on or near the project but which
may be affected by the project’s “downstream” impacts.
Some countries’ laws require that companies engage with particular
communities. For example, Australia’s Native Title Act 1933 requires
companies that have been granted a mining licence to negotiate with
aboriginal families and communities that have a legally recognised interest
in the land as native title holders or registered native title claimants.13 This
law does not require the company to consult and negotiate with the second
and third categories of community members described above. The law does,
however, provide for a more inclusive alternative;14 companies establishing

13 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), s 25.
14 The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) provides protection for native title holders
(including persons who have asserted native title rights and are awaiting
determination) rights as against all “future acts”. Future acts are defined as acts
that affect native title (i.e., government granted leases or licences to mine). A
future act is invalid if it is not first subject to negotiation with the native title
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extractive projects in Australia can opt to pursue an Indigenous Land Use
Agreement (ILUA), which expands the groups to be included in the agreementmaking process beyond those who have a legal right to be consulted.15
Leading companies often go beyond what is legally required, to include
the second and third categories of community members when determining
who will be party to a CDA. Companies can identify relevant community
groups and stakeholders by undertaking impact studies, typically with respect
to environmental, social, health, cultural and/or human rights impacts. These
assessments often begin by identifying any legal requirements to consult or
negotiate with communities, before then identifying the (often broader) group
of stakeholders that may be impacted by the project. For instance, an agreement
between Argyle Diamond Mines Pty Ltd (Argyle), the Kimberly Land Council,
and the traditional owners of the land, extended beyond the parties with
whom Argyle was legally required to enter into an agreement. Argyle sought
to include not only those traditional owners that had or sought legal recognition
of their native title rights under Australia’s Native Title Act but all community
members with “rights and interests … held by the [traditional owners] under
Aboriginal laws and customs in relation to the Agreement Area”.16
Other agreements exclusively define the affected communities
geographically according to whether they are within the project area or an
area affected by the project. For example, the Memorandum of Agreement
Relating to the Hidden Valley Gold Project, in Papua New Guinea, separately
defines the communities within the project area from other “Affected
Communities” who do not fall within the project area but are affected by the

holders. At a minimum, the Act protects native title holders’ right to negotiate.
The right to negotiate framework is more rigid and if no agreement is reached
within a specified timeframe, the parties must refer the issue to the arbitral
body (which may be a state body if the relevant state has so specified or the
National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT)). The Act also sets out an alternative
pathway that satisfies the right to negotiate requirements but is more flexible
and does not have time restrictions. This procedure is called an Indigenous
Land Use Agreement and becomes effective once it is registered with the NNTT:
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), Part 2, Div 3, subdiv P (right to negotiate) and
subdiv B-E (ILUAs).
15 See, e.g., Argyle Diamond Mine Participation Agreement, Indigenous Land Use
Agreement, 2005, Schedule 1, ILUA, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/01/
Australia-Native-Title-Holders-Argyle-2005-Agreement.pdf
16 International Council on Mining & Metals, 2010, op. cit., p. 42.
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increased traffic on the highway, use of the river, or are landowners within
the mining easement granted to the company.17
For the Ahafo Gold Project in Western Ghana, the beneficiaries of a fund
established by the mine are limited to the communities directly affected by
the mine and located within the boundaries of the concession. In the project’s
Social Responsibility Agreement, the local community is defined as
“Community towns that are physically located in the Mining Lease of Newmont
Ghana Gold Limited within the current operational area of the Ahafo Mine
Project or within the Mining Lease area under active exploration and
community/traditional areas that have a significant amount of its traditional
land covered by the Mining Lease of Newmont Ghana Gold Limited within
the current operational area of the Ahafo Mine Project or within the area of
the Mining Lease under active exploration.”18 The agreement lists the towns
considered to be part of the local community at the time the agreement was
entered into, and also provides for annual review of the composition of the
local community.19
Other agreements take a broader approach to defining the communities
who participate in the negotiation process. The Diavik Diamonds Project’s
Socio-Economic Monitoring Agreement broadly defines the relevant
communities as including Canada’s Aboriginal communities in specific regions
proximate to the project. In this agreement, Aboriginal authorities for these
regions may exercise an option to become signatories to the agreement, and
once signatories, may also exercise an option to become parties to the
agreement.20

17 Memorandum of Agreement Relating to the Hidden Valley Gold Project between
the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and The Morobe Provincial
Government; Morobe Consolidated Goldfields Limited; Nakuwi Association Inc.;
the Wau Rural Local Level Government; The Watut Rural Local Level Government;
and Wau Bulolo Urban Local Level Government, Part. A (May 5, 2005) http://
ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/01/PNG-Local-Governments-Hidden-Valley-GoldProject-2005-Agreement.pdf
18 Ahafo Social Responsibility Agreement between the Ahafo Mine Local Community
and Newmont Ghana Gold Limited (2008), Schedule 1, Clause 1, http://
ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/01/Ghana-Ahafo-Mine-Local-CommunityNewmont-Ghana-Gold-Ltd-2008-Social-Responsibility-Agreement.pdf
19 Ibid., Schedule 1, Clause 2.
20 Diavik Diamonds Project, Socio-Economic Monitoring Agreement between Diavik
Diamond Mines Inc., the Government of the Northwest Territories, and Aboriginal
signatories and parties (October 2, 1999), Art. 1.3.1, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/
files/2015/01/Canada-Northwest-Territories-and-Aboriginal-Peoples-DiavikDiamond-Mines-1999-Agreement.pdf.
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Companies can also conduct anthropological and demographic research,
such as ethnographies and social mapping, to better understand local groups
and cultures as part of determining who should be a party to a community
development agreement. Such research can help ensure the inclusion of groups
or individuals who may not be evident through ordinary community
consultation processes.21 This can be especially important when dealing with
land traditionally occupied by indigenous peoples or other customary
communities, who may conceive of their community based on broad family
relationships and shared culture and history, rather than geographical location
or legal rights to the land. Some community members may not be located on
or near the land in question at the time a company arrives, but may still have
strong cultural ties and legal entitlements to the land, and may thus stand to
be adversely impacted by the project activities.
The Argyle Diamond Mine Agreement describes its extensive pre-agreement
consultation and research efforts, including an ethnography to identify the
traditional owners of the lease area. The terms of the ethnography were set
out in a memorandum of understanding (a precursor agreement) between
the company and the Kimberly Land Council (the region’s peak indigenous
body, and the only recognised representative body for the region under federal
law) and provided that the ethnography was to be conducted by the Kimberly
Land Council and peer-reviewed by a consultant appointed by the company.22
Despite having a long history of mining operations in the area and having
already entered into numerous agreements with different traditional owners
and their families, Argyle was focused on ensuring that all traditional owners
– not just those Argyle had dealt with previously – be identified and consulted.
Research to identify relevant community groups does not need to be completed
prior to the initial contact with what is thought to be the community or its
representatives. Rather, the goal is for all relevant interests to be represented
when the negotiations begin, and for all relevant persons to be consulted
prior to the finalisation of the CDA.23

21 Joint Working Group on Indigenous Land Settlements, “Guidelines for best
practice, flexible and sustainable agreement making”, (August, 2009), p. 8.
22 Argyle Diamond Mine Participation Agreement, Indigenous Land Use Agreement,
2005, Schedule 1, ILUA, p. 66 http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/01/
Australia-Native-Title-Holders-Argyle-2005-Agreement.pdf
23 Ciaran O’Fairchaellaigh, “Negotiating Major Project Agreements: The ‘Cape York
Model,” AIATSIS Research Discussion Paper 11 (2000).

74

AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY: J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY

VOL. 7: 1: 2016

Since the organisational structures of communities may not co-relate
with who has and who does not have a legal interest in the land, it may be
necessary to consult beyond simply those who have a legal interest in the
land.24 Companies who carry out sufficient research on the cultural and
structural features of the impacted persons and groups will be best placed to
avoid or minimise, where possible, intra-community conflict over the terms
and benefits contained in the final agreement.
Finally, as well as determining which communities will be involved, it is
essential that extractive companies also carry out sufficient research and
consultations to determine who will participate in the negotiation process on
behalf of those communities. Companies should aim to facilitate an inclusive
process, through which all relevant interests are represented. The process
should also function in a way that demonstrates respect for local culture and
decision-making processes.25 Leading companies also seek to ensure that the
members of the community participating in negotiations have the backing of
the community, and regularly seek input from community members.26 Potentially
marginalised groups, such as women or children should also be adequately
represented.27 This is often a challenging task, but can be assisted by focusing
on ensuring that the process has integrity and is based on democratic principles.
The Papua New Guinea LNG Project Umbrella Benefits Sharing Agreement
sets out how community representatives were appointed to negotiate with the
company and ultimately provide the community’s consent. It describes a process
whereby representatives of landowners within the mining licence areas attended
pre-negotiation meetings, held over a three-to-four-week period, and
represented their interests. The representatives were selected by the landowners
in separate meetings. Quotas were used to ensure that leaders were selected
from all clans identified during the company’s social mapping and landowner
identification studies, and that there was at least one-woman representative

24 O’Fairchaellaigh, 2000, op. cit.; Kunanayagam and Tomlinson, 2011, op. cit.;
Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, “Agreement-making with Indigenous
Groups: Oil & Gas Development, Australia,” 2012.
25 International Council on Mining & Metals, 2010, op. cit., pp. 17, 20.
26 MiningFacts.org, What are Impact and Benefit Agreements? available at http://
www.miningfacts.org/Communities/What-are-Impact-and-Benefit-Agreements%28IBAs%29/.
27 See, eg, PNG LNG Project Umbrella Benefits Sharing Agreement, Art. 5.2(a)(iii),
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/01/PNG-Landowners-LNG-ProjectCompanies-2008-agreement.pdf
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from each licence area. It should be noted that informed consent processes
often take far longer than the time allowed for in this agreement.28
Ensuring appropriate representation of different interests is also important
where multiple groups occupy the project area. There may be internal conflicts
within the broader community, often as a consequence of previous unequal
treatment by government or other entities, which may require a more nuanced
consultation process and, potentially, multiple agreements.
4.2 Develop a Precursor Agreement and Provide Appropriate
Support to Allow the Community to Prepare for
Negotiations
A fundamental principle of negotiation is to ensure a level playing field.29
This principle should underpin the entire agreement-making process.30 Creating
a precursor agreement, such as a memorandum of understanding, is
increasingly recognised as an essential starting point for the CDA-making
process.31 Its purpose is to establish the “rules of the game” for the subsequent
negotiation process that can serve as a reference point for future negotiations.
The precursor agreement should:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Where needed, set out the process for identifying the parties to the
future CDA
Set out the parties’ goals for the project and each negotiation stage
Identify the negotiators for both sides
Specify protocols and methods of communication between the
company and the community
Establish an agreed-upon time frame for the negotiations
Outline what will be required prior to, and in addition to,

28 Papua New Guinea LNG Project Umbrella Benefits Sharing Agreement, Art. 5,
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/01/PNG-Landowners-LNG-ProjectCompanies-2008-agreement.pdf
29 Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, “Agreement-making with Indigenous
Groups: Oil & Gas Development, Australia,” 2012, op. cit., p. 58, Centre for
Social Responsibility in Mining, “World Bank Extractive Industries Sourcebook:
Good Practice Notes,” 2012, op. cit., p. 31.
30 International Council on Mining & Metals, 2010, op. cit., p. 58; Kunanayagam
and Tomlinson, 2011, op. cit.
31 O’Fairchaellaigh, 2000, op. cit.; Gibson and O’Faircheallaigh, 2010, op. cit., p.
78; Ramanie Kunanayagam & Kathryn Tomlinson, “Indigenous Peoples and
Extractive Projects: Success Factors in Compensation and Benefit Sharing
Agreements,” 9(4) Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence (2011).
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negotiations (for example, capacity-building, funding arrangements,
impact studies)
Establish expectations and a shared understanding of the meaning
of “consultation”.32
Articulate how the negotiation process itself will be funded.33

There will often be several precursor agreements associated with a single
project to ensure that the CDA negotiation process is fair and effective. This
approach is illustrated by the Argyle Diamond Mine Agreement,34 whose prenegotiation stage lasted several years. Documents attached to this agreement
include numerous precursor agreements and the various consultation and
communication tools used during the agreement-making stage. In addition
to environmental impact assessments, which were required by law, the
company, community and other stakeholders came together in numerous
meetings, using a variety of communication tools, including posters, videos
and workshops to ensure that all participants understood what was being
discussed and decided. The company also consulted with the local community
members and representatives regarding specific issues, such as water resources
and land rehabilitation.
There are a number of advantages to beginning the process with one or
more pre-negotiation agreements. Such agreements allow the parties to address
past grievances and enable the company to demonstrate its commitment to
engaging with the community. They also constitute a formalisation of the
relationship between the parties, to ensure all parties feel that the agreed
process is fair and equitable.35 One of the essential features of a pre-negotiation
framework is identifying whether the mining company will contribute
“participatory funding.”36 Participatory funding is the money and other
resources necessary to ensure the community’s effective participation in the
negotiation process. For example, the community may need to hire advisers
and legal representatives, or engage in negotiation training or other capacity-

32 InterGroup Consultants, 2008, op. cit., pp. 19, 24.
33 For a more comprehensive list of topics usually included see Gibson and
O’Faircheallaigh, 2010, op. cit., p. 79.
34 Argyle Diamond Mine Participation Agreement, Indigenous Land Use Agreement,
2005, Schedule 1, ILUA, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/01/AustraliaNative-Title-Holders-Argyle-2005-Agreement.pdf
35 International Council on Mining & Metals, 2010, op. cit., p. 55; Kunanayagam
and Tomlinson, 2011, op. cit.
36 InterGroup Consultants, 2008, op. cit., p. 25.
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and institution-building programmes designed to ensure community agency
and ownership of the process.37 This is particularly important when engaging
with indigenous or customary communities, where there may be a higher
likelihood of linguistic and cultural barriers between the company and the
community.
Leading practices also include determining the scope and extent of
participatory funding needed during the course of negotiations. Determining
the community participation budget as early as possible will help to avoid
any funding-related limitations on what can be accomplished between the
parties. There may be a role for government to provide funding, and multilateral
institutions and non-governmental organisations may be willing to contribute
funds as well. Due to the high cost of capacity building and the negotiation
process, companies will often need to provide at least some of the funds.38
In addition to capacity-building programmes and external advisers or
experts to assist the community in the negotiation process, participatory
funding can also contribute to the establishment of decision-making processes
or institutions, if none exists, to ensure that every member of the community
is or can be involved in the decisions made during negotiations and throughout
the life of the project. Of the 22 agreements reviewed, few contain reference
to or details of precursor agreements made during negotiations. The Argyle
Diamond Mine Agreement details each of the precursor agreements made
between the parties and annexes in full the Memorandum of Understanding
that sets out negotiating principles and stages, the substantive issues for
negotiation and the financial assistance Argyle would provide for the
negotiation process.39 According to the MOU, Argyle would give the Kimberley
Land Council (KLC) an advance payment which would then be followed by
payments to meet KLC’s expenses during negotiations.40
KLC also agreed to seek government funding, with Argyle making up any
difference in funding.41 The agreement also contained a schedule of the amounts
paid to KLC for the benefit of the traditional owners during the negotiation

37 InterGroup Consultants, 2008, op. cit., pp. 17, 25; Kunanayagam and Tomlinson,
2011, op. cit.
38 O’Fairchaellaigh, 2000, op. cit.; Native Title Payments Working Group, “Native
Title payments working group report”, p. 3.
39 Argyle Diamond Mine Participation Agreement, Indigenous Land Use Agreement,
2005, Schedule 1, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/01/Australia-NativeTitle-Holders-Argyle-2005-Agreement.pdf.
40 Ibid., Memorandum of Understanding, Art. 4.
41 Ibid., Art. 4.4.
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process, which totalled AUD$2million.42 In contrast, the Raglan Agreement,
which concerned a project in Quebec, Canada, provided funding for the
negotiation process on a reimbursement basis only, rather than an initial
grant of money.43
It is also appropriate to determine how representatives from the local
and/or national government will be involved. Governments can facilitate
negotiations between the company and community, or attend negotiations as
an independent third party.44 In other cases, it may be appropriate to conduct
negotiations without government involvement.
Companies demonstrating leading practices also recognise that cultural
and linguistic differences can present barriers to the agreement-making process.
Companies increasingly provide cultural awareness training to their staff to
aid the communication process.45 Other effective practices for companies
include having employees learn the local language, collaboratively developing
definitions of technical terms for which local languages may not have
equivalents, and developing other approaches to engagement and negotiations
that are not overly legal or technical.46 Encouraging greater understanding of
each party’s legal and cultural traditions can also be achieved through
orientation programmes and meetings.
4.3 Facilitate the Community’s Articulation of a Negotiating
Position
Through a negotiating position, a community can express how it wishes be
involved in and benefit from the project.47 Negotiating positions can act as a
starting point for negotiations, providing the mining company with a clear

42 Argyle Diamond Mine Participation Agreement, Indigenous Land Use Agreement,
2005, Schedule 1, Art. 7.
43 ICMM, op. cit., 2010, p. 65.
44 MiningFacts.org, “Case Study: Diavik Diamond Mine,” in What Are Impact and
Benefit Agreements? available at http://www.miningfacts.org/Communities/
What-are-Impact-and-Benefit-Agreements-%28IBAs%29/.
45 International Council on Mining & Metals (2010), op. cit., p. 33 (describing
cultural awareness training carried out by Cerrejon Coal in the Guajira region of
Colombia, where approximately 40% of the 656,000 inhabitants are Wayuu).
46 Kunanayagam and Tomlinson, 2011, op. cit.; International Council on Mining &
Metals, 2010, op. cit., pp. 20, 29, 32; Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining,
“Agreement-making with Indigenous Groups: Oil & Gas Development, Australia,”
2012, op. cit., p. 54.
47 O’Fairchaellaigh, 2000, op. cit, p. 14.
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articulation of the community’s priorities and interests.48 They are generally
articulated in non-technical or legal terms and act as a general expression of
priorities, rather than a “bottom line” or binding legal offer from the
community. They can also act as a vehicle for community members to
collectively reflect upon priorities before negotiations begin, and help to draw
attention amongst community members to the negotiation process.49 A
negotiating position is generally discussed and approved internally by the
community before being presented to the company.
A negotiating position can also serve as a point of reference and
comparison for the community. The community can assess proposals made
by the company or by specific community members against the negotiating
position to determine how such proposals do and do not meet their priorities.50
This can also assist the company in obtaining the community’s free, prior,
and informed consent on decisions that are put to it. The scope and depth of
a negotiating position will vary from community to community, depending
on the project’s likely impacts.
While the negotiating position is developed by the community, companies
can assist this process by allowing sufficient time and privacy for the community
to internally determine its position. Company contributions for participatory
funding can also assist communities to conduct sufficient outreach, research
and internal coordination, enabling them to arrive at an agreed upon
negotiating position.
Developing a negotiating position is an essential stage in the “Cape York
Model” for negotiating major project agreements with indigenous peoples in
Cape York, Australia. Under this model, the negotiating position is drafted by
a land council representing the indigenous people of a specific region, and is
based on the priorities and issues identified in impact assessments and any
other available preliminary research.51 Those representing the community
are chosen around the time that the negotiating position is developed. The
representatives are then tasked with pursuing the negotiating position, and
any changes to the position or final decisions regarding the agreement must
be referred back to community members to decide.52 While the Cape York
Model articulates the development of a negotiating position as a distinct

48
49
50
51
52

Indigenous Support Services, op. cit, p. 46.
O’Fairchaellaigh, 2000, op. cit, p. 14.
O’Fairchaellaigh, 2000, op. cit, p. 14.
O’Fairchaellaigh, 2000, op. cit, p. 14.
O’Fairchaellaigh, 2000, op. cit, p. 14.
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stage in the agreement-making process, it may be incorporated into other
stages of the negotiation process, depending on how the community wishes
to proceed.
4.4 Ensure Community Participation and Informed DecisionMaking during Negotiations and Other Processes
Leading companies incorporate a participatory approach into all aspects of
agreement making,53 and planning for the project. One common way in which
community involvement in the preparatory phases of the project occurs is
through domestic law requirements for the carrying out of social and
environmental impact assessments.54 When carried out in a consultative
manner, such processes provide a vehicle for communities that stand to be
affected by the project to share their perspectives. For example, where
indigenous peoples with long-standing ties to the land are involved in an
impact assessment, they can contribute their traditional knowledge and
understanding of the land and nearby ecosystems by identifying areas that
are used as the basis for local livelihoods, as well as are culturally significant
or ecologically sensitive.
Community participation and informed decision-making can also be
facilitated by ensuring that sufficient information is provided to communities
during the pre-negotiation stage. Leading industry practices include providing
information about the project in a timely and culturally appropriate manner,
and in a format that is accessible by community members.55 Ensuring
community participation and informed decision-making will not only benefit
community members; there is also increasing evidence that it can improve a
project’s financial performance.
Recent studies have drawn a direct link between company-community
conflicts arising from unmitigated environmental and social risks, and
significant business costs for the mining company.56 One study noted that in
53 World Bank, Mining Community Development Agreements: Source Book (2012),
14.
54 With respect to indigenous peoples, this involvement is enshrined in the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Articles 18 and 19.
55 See, e.g., International Council on Mining & Metals, “Good Practice Guide:
Indigenous Peoples and Mining,” (2010), p. 15, para. 3.
56 Daniel M. Franks, Rachel Davis, Anthony J. Bebbington, Saleem H. Ali, Deanna
Kemp, and Martin Scurrah, “Conflict translates environmental and social risk
into business costs,” PNAS Vol. 111, No. 21 (27 May 2014); The Munden Project,
“Communities as Counterparties: Preliminary Review of Concessions and Conflict
in Emerging and Frontier Market Concessions,” 30 October 2015.

2016

EMERGING PRACTICES IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS

81

addition to a legislative and policy environment that encourages impact
assessment and management, the increased involvement of communities in
dialogue and decision-making during the early stages of a project is an
important means of managing environmental and social risks.57 In order to
facilitate this dialogue and direct participation, companies must ensure that
the local community is represented and involved in all of the pre-agreement
stages, so that the community can shape and consent to decisions made as
part of that process.
Many companies regard the prospect of allowing community participation
in decision-making for the project itself, rather than only the CDA, with great
caution. This is because meaningful community participation in decisionmaking means that the company has less control over decisions that can
impact on the project’s timetable and budget.58 On the other hand, allowing
for greater community engagement and control may avert conflicts between
the company and the community, whose costs can be greater than those
associated with any changes to spending or work timetables that communities
may pursue.59
The stage at which the community is engaged can also have a substantial
impact on the financial costs to the company and the sustainability of the
project. If companies choose not to address risks until a conflict or complaint
arises, then their options for properly addressing the grievance become
limited.60 In addition, while responding to grievances can have an immediate
mitigating effect in the short term, it will not necessarily contribute to the
long-term stability of the project and the company-community relationship.
4.5 Ensure that Benefits Shared Extend beyond Financial
Compensation
It is now generally recognised that monetary compensation, while often legally
required, will seldom ensure that affected communities’ lives and livelihoods
can be properly restored.61 One ex-World Bank staffer, for instance, has
Franks et al, 2014, op. cit., p. 7580.
InterGroup Consultants, 2008, op. cit., p. 17.
Franks, 2014, op. cit., p. 3.
For an overview of government- and company-established grievance mechanisms,
see “Grievance Mechanisms”, Negotiation Support Portal, http://
negotiationsupport.org/roadmap/grievance-mechanisms-0
61 Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, “World Bank Extractive Industries
Sourcebook: Good Practice Notes,” 2012, op. cit., p. 5; International Council on
Mining & Metals, 2010, op. cit., p. 67; Native Title Payments Working Group
Report (2009), p, 7; Kunanayagam and Tomlinson, 2011, op. cit.

57
58
59
60
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lamented that the limits of compensation as a remedy “reinforce the main
poverty risks inherent in forced displacements.”62 This is due to the many
ruptures to economic, social, cultural, and other networks that occur when a
community is forced off its land, which are often unquantifiable. The more
effective CDAs share benefits flowing from the resource development to
promote broader long-term and ongoing economic and social participation
in the project.63 Such benefits include financial contributions, such as a royalty
stream linked to production, and non-financial benefits, such as local
employment opportunities and commitments to source goods and services
from local providers. Monetary compensation can still be effectively employed
to acknowledge those project impacts that cannot be adequately remedied.
One of the goals of benefit sharing is to strengthen a community’s capacity
for self-determined development by improving its physical, economic and
human capital.64 This includes efforts to avoid communities becoming overly
dependent on income streams from the project, which can leave them
vulnerable if the project fails or becomes less productive. This is another
reason for designing CDAs to provide a combination of financial and nonfinancial benefits; such a combination can help to link community wellbeing to the sustainability of the project, while also providing transferable
skills, such as business and management skills, that equip the community to
continue its economic development after the mine project closes.
Financial benefits provided to communities should be predictable, stable,
comprehensible, and sufficiently adapted to the project and the community.
Additionally, they should be founded on recognition of and respect for the
community’s aspirations. Revenue sharing between different levels of
government and local communities has also been increasingly employed in
recent years.65 This approach seeks to address the fact that while federal
governments usually receive most of the revenue from a project, it is the local
branch of government, and the community itself, which encounters the majority
of social and economic impacts.

62 Michael M. Cernea, “For a New Economics of Resettlement: A Sociological Critique
of the Compensation Principle,” 175 International Social Science Journal (2003)
pp. 5, 17.
63 Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, “World Bank Extractive Industries
Sourcebook: Good Practice Notes,” 2012, op. cit., p. 5; International Council on
Mining & Metals, 2010, op. cit., p. 67; Native Title Payments Working Group
Report (2009), p, 7; Kunanayagam and Tomlinson, 2011, op. cit.
64 International Council on Mining & Metals, 2010, op. cit., p. 81.
65 InterGroup Consultants, 2008, op. cit., p. 81.
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Revenue sharing can take various forms.66 Communities can receive fixed
payments, which are predictable and more easily understood,67 but which
will not increase if the project’s profitability does. They can also receive
royalties based on the volume of outputs or the volume of production, which
are not directly vulnerable to commodity price drops, but which also will not
deliver additional benefits when the project becomes more profitable.
Approaches which maximise the potential gain for communities, but which
also contain the most risk and dependence on market trends, include revenue
streams based on company profits or the allocation to the community of an
equity share in the project company. CDAs can also set out a combination of
different types of revenue streams. For instance, the Newmont Ahafo Mine
Development Foundation Agreement contains multiple types of financial
benefit sharing. The agreement requires the company to pay to a community
foundation US$1 for every ounce of gold from the mine sold, as well as 1 per
cent of the company’s net pre-tax income, and of any gains made in selling
assets that total US$100,000 or more.68
Non-financial benefit sharing encompasses a wider spectrum of benefits,
including employment, training, business development, and infrastructure
and/or support services. The specific benefits that are included in any
agreement will depend on the community’s context and aspirations, as well
as the project itself.69 When implemented appropriately, each type of benefit
operates to improve the opportunities and earning potential for members of
the community, potentially contributing to the sustainability of the CDA itself.70
66 For a comprehensive summary of the many different forms that financial benefits
can take, see Gibson and O’Faircheallaigh, 2010, op. cit. For a more detailed
discussion see, Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, “Agreement-making
with Indigenous Groups: Oil & Gas Development, Australia,” 2012, op. cit., p.
81. See, e.g., Agreement between Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation
and Newmont Ghana Gold Limited, 2008, Clause 11.1 http://ccsi.columbia.edu/
files/2015/01/Ghana-Ahafo-Mine-Local-Community-Newmont-Ghana-GoldLtd-2008-Development-Foundation-Agreement.pdf
67 Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, “Agreement-making with Indigenous
Groups: Oil & Gas Development, Australia,” 2012, op. cit., p. 79.
68 Agreement between Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation and Newmont
Ghana Gold Limited, Art. 11.1, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/01/GhanaAhafo-Mine-Local-Community-Newmont-Ghana-Gold-Ltd-2008-DevelopmentFoundation-Agreement.pdf.
69 Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, “Agreement-making with Indigenous
Groups: Oil & Gas Development, Australia,” 2012, op. cit., p. 75.
70 International Council on Mining & Metals, 2010, op. cit., p. 81; Centre for Social
Responsibility in Mining, “Agreement-making with Indigenous Groups: Oil &
Gas Development, Australia,” 2012, op. cit., pp. 75, 92.
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Each of these benefits is discussed only at a high level in this article, given the
complexities and variation that different contexts can introduce.
4.5.1 Employment
Employment opportunities are regarded as one of the most desirable benefits
that CDAs can provide communities. One study has noted, however, that
solely providing training and preferential access to job opportunities will
generally be insufficient to meet the needs of the local community.71 Instead,
leading practices implement employment opportunities alongside meaningful
community involvement in the project’s development and the design of
mitigation measures and remedies for adverse impacts, alongside other project
benefits discussed in this section.72 In low-income communities, common
barriers to fulfilling a company’s employment goals include low education
levels and a lack of employment experience; companies will need to invest in
skills development and training initiatives amongst community members to
overcome such challenges. Studies have also shown that CDAs which involve
specific or rolling targets for job creation and employment training help
ensure that the company is committed to hiring locally and carrying out
trainings on an ongoing basis.73
One publicly available agreement that provides detailed provisions
regarding benefit-sharing and community participation is the Diavik Diamonds
Project Socio-Economic Monitoring Agreement.74 While this particular
agreement does not provide any formal ownership of equity in the project, it
does provide employment and training benefits that increase the stake and
role of members of aboriginal communities in the mine’s operation. The
agreement places a strong focus on recruiting, training and retaining its
employees, including prescribing a workforce quota for members of local
aboriginal communities using a cumulative percentage goal at various stages
of the project.75 The company retains considerable discretion over its
employment practices, however, and there is no penalty that applies if it does

71
72
73
74
75

InterGroup Consultants, 2008, op. cit., Executive Summary.
InterGroup Consultants, 2008, op. cit., Executive Summary.
Gibson and O’Faircheallaigh, 2010, op. cit., p. 145.
The authors understand that this agreement is in the process of being disbanded.
Diavik Diamonds Project, Socio-Economic Monitoring Agreement between Diavik
Diamond Mines Inc., the Government of the Northwest Territories, and Aboriginal
signatories and parties (2 October 1999), Art. 3.2, Appendix A, http://
ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/01/Canada-Northwest-Territories-andAboriginal-Peoples-Diavik-Diamond-Mines-1999-Agreement.pdf.
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not meet its recruitment goals. The agreement also actively promotes and
encourages careers in diamond mining for the youth of the region where the
mine is located, although again this is left at the discretion of the company,
and no details are provided in the agreement.
In addition, the agreement establishes a number of training programmes
aimed at increasing access to jobs for members of aboriginal communities
and equipping them with transferable and project-related skills, such as
technical, technological, supervisory and managerial roles.76 To help retain
employees, the company has created a rotation work schedule (four weeks
on, two weeks off) that is compatible with the schedules of aboriginal
employees practicing a traditional lifestyle. It also funds community research
projects addressing barriers to successful employment.
An example of a CDA that emphasises the importance of cultural sensitivity
in employment as a key means of retaining aboriginal employees is the Raglan
Agreement. That agreement seeks to encourage social harmony within the
workforce by promoting inter-cultural understanding through cross-cultural
training for all supervisors and managers, inviting local artists to perform
outside of working hours at the project site, organising sports events between
employees and residents, and ensuring access to traditional food sources.77
The Argyle Diamond Mine Participation Agreement’s Management Plan
Agreement also demonstrates how CDAs can facilitate the company to help
local businesses develop. In it the company commits to helping traditional
owners establish businesses and develop good management practices, and
where appropriate, an Argyle employee would help the business on an ongoing
basis for three years.
Even though companies promised to create job opportunities, the review
of CDAs for this article did not reveal a practice of establishing procedures or
penalties for when a company does not meet the targets or other employment
goals set out in CDAs. Furthermore, agreements tend to contain clauses that
leave considerable discretion in the company’s hiring methods or weaken its
hiring obligations by limiting the circumstances under which a company
must employ a member of the local community over another non-local
candidate. One potential reason for the reluctance to be tied to strict obligations
is that a company cannot be sure that it will meet the targets, which depend

76 Ibid., Art. 3.3, Appendix B.
77 Raglan Agreement between Makivik Corporation and Others and Société Minière
Raglan du Québec Ltée (1995), Art. 5.5, Draft available at: http://
pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/makivik/ci236.pdf
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on the alignment of several variables, including availability of willing and
qualified individuals and the operator’s ability to meet the intended construction
and development timetable. Nonetheless, in order to ensure that CDAs lead to
more tangible employment benefits for local communities, companies should
agree to clear and enforceable commitments to carry out programmes for
training and recruitment of candidates from the local community.
While many companies have found it difficult to retain local community
employees, some practices have led to increased employee retention. These
include providing clear, accessible career advancement pathways for
employees, as well as initiating mentoring programmes for less experienced
employees, establishing initiatives to eliminate workplace racism and bias,
and offering pre-employment and on-the-job skills training programmes. Some
analysts also emphasise the importance of increasing the number of local
community members in management positions.78
4.5.2 Training
Training, which is closely linked to employment, has traditionally focused on
ensuring that workers learn the skills necessary for their day-to-day employment
on the project. Companies seeking to foster more enduring community
development could increase efforts to provide programmes that meet other
needs of the local community, providing transferable skills and training for
occupations that serve both the project and the community, as well as those
that can be useful in promoting sustainable development beyond the life of
the mine.79
4.5.3 Business Development
In relation to business development or “supply chain procurement”, the review
revealed that companies seem to view the most effective way of utilising and
supporting local businesses is to form joint ventures with existing and new
local businesses to provide goods or services to the project.80 Business
development trainings for members of local communities are also often carried
out. For instance, the Diavik Socio-Economic Monitoring Agreement sets out
a range of business capacity-building commitments “to assist and enable

78 InterGroup Consultants, 2008, op. cit., p. 60.
79 InterGroup Consultants, 2008, op. cit., p. 64.
80 Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, “Agreement-making with Indigenous
Groups: Oil & Gas Development, Australia,” 2012, op. cit., p. 92; InterGroup
Consultants, 2008, op. cit., p. 69.
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Northern Businesses to take advantage of Project related business
opportunities.”81
4.5.4 Infrastructure
Company and community efforts to ensure greater community participation
have extended to the realm of infrastructure and service provision. This is
notable given that communities were previously not generally regarded as
potential owners or managers of key infrastructure and other services,
particularly in developing countries and in rural or remote regions. Leading
practices include seeking the advice and involvement of local community
members to ensure that services and infrastructure meet the community’s
needs.82 In some cases, CDAs may outline where infrastructure built for a
project may be shared, utilised, as well as managed, maintained and even
owned, by communities. CDAs may also set up financial flows to community
organisations which may then be able to fund specific development or
infrastructure projects. National and local governments should generally be
involved to ensure that the new infrastructure projects align with the national
and local priorities for development of infrastructure.
It is also essential that companies consider the sustainability of infrastructure
and service provision for after the project has concluded. A useful approach can
be to strengthen management bodies and establish partnerships with existing
government institutions in order to best prepare for mine closure.
The Development Foundation Agreement between Newmont Ahafo
Development Foundation and Newmont Ghana Gold Ltd is an example of an
attempt to foster greater community participation and public ownership of
the project and associated benefits. The agreement provided that infrastructure
projects completed were jointly owned by the community’ and the District
Assembly, and allocated to them the responsibility for their maintenance and
management. Where personnel or other resources would be required, the
District Assembly agreed to liaise with the local government agency.83 The

81 Diavik Diamonds Project, Socio-Economic Monitoring Agreement between Diavik
Diamond Mines Inc., the Government of the Northwest Territories, and Aboriginal
signatories and parties (October 2, 1999), Appendix C, http://
ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/01/Canada-Northwest-Territories-andAboriginal-Peoples-Diavik-Diamond-Mines-1999-Agreement.pdf.
82 International Council on Mining & Metals, 2010, op. cit., p. 86.
83 Ahafo Development Foundation Agreement between the Ahafo Mine Local
Community and Newmont Ghana Gold Limited (2008), Art. 9.4, http://
ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/01/Ghana-Ahafo-Mine-Local-CommunityNewmont-Ghana-Gold-Ltd-2008-Development-Foundation-Agreement.pdf.

88

AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY: J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY

VOL. 7: 1: 2016

agreement does not specify other means of obtaining financial or other
resources if the government agency is unable to assist. It also does not require
the company to assist in the development of a maintenance and management
plan for the project. Instead, the process under which these projects would be
developed includes the involvement of the newly created Ahafo Development
Foundation, which is run by a board of trustees and composed of company
and community representatives.
The Foundation is established under a related social responsibility
agreement, and its role is to consider proposals from District Assemblies for
sustainable development projects and fund those it approves. The agreement
set out that the Foundation would receive revenue from the project, which
could be applied towards programmes for developing infrastructure and
delivering other services.84 In this example, the Foundation acted as an
intermediary body, limiting Newmont’s financial and managerial
responsibility over infrastructure and service provision.
A different arrangement was established by the Memorandum of
Agreement relating to the Development of the Porgera Gold Mine Project in
Papua New Guinea, which required the joint venture company to ensure the
supply of electricity to individual houses in existing and future resettled
residential settlements of families whose resettlement was linked to the grant
of mining concessions.85 No end date was specified for this obligation,
although the electricity can be subject to the usual charges by the electricity
supplier.86
4.6 Ensure Strong, Accountable Governance Arrangements
to Facilitate Effective Implementation, Monitoring,
Review and Potential Adjustment of the Agreement
4.6.1 Governance Mechanisms
In order to secure the effective functioning of the CDA, leading practice
agreements include governance arrangements for managing the ongoing

84 Ibid., Art. 11.1.
85 Memorandum of Agreement relating to the Development of the Porgera Gold
Mine Project between the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and Porgera
Landowners, Art. 18, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/01/PNG-PorgeraNational-Government-1989-Agreement.pdf
86 The Joint Venture was also not a party to the agreement, although it is unclear
whether an investment contract between Papua New Guinea and the joint venture
company impacts on the enforceability of this obligation.
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relationship between the local community and the company.87 These provisions
typically cover aspects of the CDA such as liaison and management committees,
financial management structures, dispute resolution processes, and monitoring
and review processes. Designing and establishing governance arrangements
depend heavily on the local context, including the specific community’s existing
organisational and deliberative structures and its capacity for following and
enforcing governance procedures.88
The company should also provide capacity building for the community
in relation to the ongoing monitoring and implementation of the CDA, and
participation in any relevant structures. One example of a governance structure
is a liaison committee that comprises company and community representatives
who are charged with managing company-community relations, as was done
in the Regional Indigenous Land Use Agreement for Small Scale Mining in
Victoria, Australia. In that agreement, the indigenous community signatories
to the agreement appointed the Dja Dja Wurrung Clans Aboriginal Corporation
(a body recognised under Australia’s Native Title Act as being legally capable
of representing the interests of indigenous peoples) to act as a communication
liaison between the community and the miners.89 The agreement did not
provide further detail on the frequency of meetings or specific responsibilities
and functions. Such structures will be most effective when clear rules are
drawn regarding how disputes or grievances will be managed.
Structures that can be established can be charged with oversight and
monitoring of the agreement. For instance, the Ahafo Ghana Gold Mine’s
agreement established an Agreement Forum that was granted oversight
responsibility for the implementation of the agreement.90 The agreement also
established a Community Consultative Committee that would manage

87 International Council on Mining & Metals, 2010, op. cit., p. 69.
88 Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, “Agreement-making with Indigenous
Groups: Oil & Gas Development, Australia,” 2012, op. cit.; Centre for Social
Responsibility in Mining, “World Bank Extractive Industries Sourcebook: Good
Practice Notes,” 2012, op. cit., p. 31; Kunanayagam and Tomlinson, 2011, op.
cit.
89 Regional Indigenous Land Use Agreement for Small Scale Mining in Victoria,
Australia between the Dja Dja Wurrung People and Prospectors &
Miners’Association of Vicotira Incorporated, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/
2015/01/Australia-Dja-Dja-Wurrung-People-Prospectors-Miners-Associationof-Vic-2009-Agreement.pdf
90 Ahafo Social Responsibility Agreement between the Ahafo Mine Local Community
and Newmont Ghana Gold Limited (2008), Arts. 5-9, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/
files/2015/01/Ghana-Ahafo-Mine-Local-Community-Newmont-Ghana-GoldLtd-2008-Social-Responsibility-Agreement.pdf
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information and communication between the company, community and other
stakeholders.91
Alongside building capacity and establishing governance structures in
the community, is the issue of sharing decision-making power. In recent years,
there has been a trend towards increasing the amount of decision-making
responsibilities in local community hands, though the balance remains firmly
in the company’s favour. This has been reflected in CDAs that include, for
example, an environmental committee constituted entirely by local community
members whose function is to assess the environmental impact of the mine
and make recommendations for action.92 Partnerships, including with civil
society organisations, are particularly useful where the community needs
assistance in implementing the agreement and holding the company to its
end of the bargain. Companies should also be willing to engage in
collaborative capacity-building with community members and other
stakeholders through adequately funded representative bodies.
4.6.2 Monitoring
Leading practice agreements provide for ongoing monitoring and review of
the agreement’s implementation to ensure that the local community is
appropriately involved, and has the best possible chance of maximising any
benefits of the project. These procedures also further the goals of transparency
and accountability, and help to ensure the local community obtains a degree
of ownership and control over the project.
Available literature shows, however, that most agreements fall short in
meeting expectations at the implementation stage.93 Indeed, many of the CDAs
reviewed for this article did not contain detailed provisions concerning
implementation and monitoring. A number of strategies exist to ensure greater
accountability in implementation. Implementation may be improved where
companies partner with local civil society groups to ensure that CDA

91 Ibid., Arts. 18-19.
92 International Council on Mining & Metals, 2010, op. cit., p. 69.
93 Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, “World Bank Extractive Industries
Sourcebook: Good Practice Notes,” 2012, op. cit., p. 31-34.
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commitments are fulfilled.94 Similarly, companies can strengthen the local
and regional government’s administrative and local delivery capacity, and
help to develop a cooperative relationship with such actors to assist with
service delivery under the CDA.
The Diavik Diamonds Agreement provides an example of a complex
governance arrangement aimed at monitoring of an agreement; it created a
Group Advisory Board whose role is to assist, coordinate, monitor, review
and advise all parties in relation to the project across a broad range of issues,
such as employment, training and business development. It is also responsible
for ensuring that all parties fulfil their commitments under the agreement.
The Board is composed of representatives of all parties to the Agreement
(including Diavik Diamond Mines, the Northwest Territories Government and
several Aboriginal signatories and parties listed in the agreement document),
and is charged with monitoring the mine’s progress, as well as its social and
economic impacts.95
4.6.3

Enforcement

Effective grievance mechanisms and strong enforcement mechanisms are key
to strengthening the impetus on the company to implement the agreement
effectively.96 The most common approach among available Canadian and
Australian agreements is to establish a dispute resolution framework that
emphasises amicable resolution through dialogue and mediation before either
party has a right to enforce the contract in court or at a tribunal. Some

94 For example, the Participatory Environmental and Social Management
Programme (PESMP) undertaken by Hunt Oil in the southern region of Peru
was established by an independent NGO to provide an opportunity for
communities to participate in monitoring the project’s environmental and social
performance. The PESMP involved community members, local authorities, civil
society, government officers and international financial institutions: IPIECA,
“Indigenous Peoples and the oil and gas industry: Context, issues and emerging
good practice”, (2012), pp. 32-5.
95 Diavik Diamonds Project, Socio-Economic Monitoring Agreement between Diavik
Diamond Mines Inc., the Government of the Northwest Territories, and Aboriginal
signatories and parties (October 2, 1999), Art. 2.1, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/
files/2015/01/Canada-Northwest-Territories-and-Aboriginal-Peoples-DiavikDiamond-Mines-1999-Agreement.pdf.
96 For a more in-depth discussion of grievance mechanisms in community
engagement, see Mandelbaum and Loutit, “Extractive Industry Investments
and Human Rights” in Research Handbook on Human Rights and Investments
(Yannick Radi, ed., forthcoming).
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agreements impose an obligation on the company to pay compensation for
loss or damage caused by non-performance of a contractual obligation.97
Where agreement clauses are vaguely worded,however, proving that particular
obligations exist, or have been breached, may be difficult. Similar challenges
in enforcement will occur for provisions leaving considerable discretion to
the company – for example in the fulfilment of imprecisely worded employment
targets.
Even where clauses are clearly worded, communities may struggle to
enforce the agreement and obtain remedies for breaches if the country lacks
a reliable and accessible legal system and the company is not interested in
responding to the community’s concerns or complying with its contractual
obligations. One way to ensure that an agreement is enforceable is to tie the
enforcement of the CDA to the company’s investment agreement with the
state, or other agreements by which the company is granted rights to carry
out the project. This could be done by drafting the investor-state agreement
so that certain breaches of the CDA by the company would be considered a
material breach of the investor-state agreement, thus giving the state the
option of terminating the agreement. The state would then have additional
leverage when seeking to persuade the investor to comply with the CDA.
Alternatively, states can enact laws that deem conditions in a communitycompany agreement to be conditions of mining authorisations. For instance,
the Mineral Resources Act 1989 in the Australian state of Queensland requires
negotiation and consultation with registered native title holders or claimants98
for mining leases over Aboriginal reserve lands in certain circumstances.99
Such negotiations may result in a negotiated agreement between the company,
the native title holders or claimants and the state government, in which the
native title holders consent to the granting of the proposed mining lease.100
The relevant Minister, on behalf of the state government, can then consent to
the conditions of that agreement being deemed to be conditions of the mining
lease itself,101 meaning that a breach of a condition between an affected
native title holder or claimant can jeopardise the validity of the company’s
authorisation to carry out mining activities.

97 This type of enforcement clause can be seen in the Greenlandic agreements
reviewed: see http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/greenland-2/.
98 Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld), s 655 describes which native title holders
and claimants are covered.
99 Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld), Schedule 1A, ss. 658, 659.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., s. 276A.

2016

EMERGING PRACTICES IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS

93

4.7 Plan for Mine Closure and Legacy Issues
Sustainable CDAs are judged not only by their success during the life of the
project but also after mine closure. Two important goals of a CDA should be
to ensure that the project’s environmental effects are appropriately managed
and remediated, and that closure does not abruptly halt the community’s
socio-economic development. Leading practice agreements start to plan for
closure from the beginningof the project, and ensure that closure planning
remains a central focus throughout the project. Some leading methods to
plan for closure include the following.102
1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

Make known the expected closure date, or the timetable for
determining the likely closure date. This needs to be communicated
with provisos regarding the fact that projects can be subject to
temporary or permanent closure for unexpected reasons, such as
the fall of commodity prices, natural disasters, and social unrest.
Actively engage the community on how the impact of closure can
be addressed (see Box 10 for examples of how this was done in
some of the agreements reviewed).
Assist the community to develop alternative local economies
If necessary, design and implement low-tech physical infrastructure,
which the community and/or local government can maintain postclosure
Contribute to the building of community governance capacity for
dealing with any mine legacy issues (see Leading Practice 6).

Although the importance of planning for closure is generally
acknowledged, many of the agreements reviewed do not provide much detail
on the issue of mine closure and environmental rehabilitation. The agreements
reviewed often state that the parties agree to create a closure and rehabilitation
taskforce and/or plan at some future time, but precise details and actions are
usually not included. Agreements should include action plans for dealing
with expected and unexpected closure at the outset and create a closure
taskforce at the time of execution of the agreement in order to ensure that
closure and rehabilitation are given the necessary attention throughout the
life of the project.
Exceptions to this trend include the Tolukuma Gold Mining Project
Agreement, which states clearly how the community will be engaged in relation

102 International Council on Mining & Metals, 2010, op. cit., p. 92.
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to mine closure and rehabilitation. The agreement sets out that the Papua New
Guinean national government will create a task force three years prior to the
closure, and require that a Conceptual Mine Closure Plan be circulated for comment
by key stakeholders to ensure rehabilitation of the project area and sustainability
of the local communities.103
The Agreement between Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation and
Newmont Ghana Gold Ltd also provides useful detail on mine closure. It
provides that the company and the community will work together to identify
and develop programmes for the closure and reclamation of the mine. The
agreement includes a closure plan, to be administered by a mine closure
panel, which is made up of stakeholders in the community and company. The
company will also assist in capacity building and training for those members
of the community who will participate in the closure and reclamation
programmes.104
4.8 CDAs Should Generally not be Confidential
Consistent with the objectives of transparency, accountability and good
governance, there is a growing recognition that confidentiality clauses in
CDAs should be avoided, or be heavily qualified.105 Confidentiality provisions
can weaken the capacity and power of local communities by prohibiting
them from communicating with the media and other stakeholders for advice,
support and informational purposes, when needed.106 Companies or industry
bodies may argue that CDAs contain commercially sensitive information and
hence ought not to be publicly disclosed. This argument is undermined by the
fact that such agreements may be extensively circulated within the private
sector already, and that they do not generally contain information that, if

103 Memorandum of Agreement (revised) relating to the Tolukuma Gold Mining
Project between the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and the Central
Provisionsal Government, the Woitape Local Level Government and Tolukuma
Gold Mines Limited and Yulai Landowners Association Inc (2007) Art. 11,
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/01/PNG-Tolukuma-Clayfield-Pty-Ltd2007-Agreement.pdf
104 Ahafo Social Responsibility Agreement between the Ahafo Mine Local
Community and Newmont Ghana Gold Limited (2008), Schedule 4, http://
ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/01/Ghana-Ahafo-Mine-Local-CommunityNewmont-Ghana-Gold-Ltd-2008-Social-Responsibility-Agreement.pdf
105 International Council on Mining & Metals, 2010, op. cit., p. 60; InterGroup
Consultants, 2008, op. cit., p. 89.
106 Gibson and O’Faircheallaigh, 2010, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
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disclosed, would have a concrete impact on the company’s competitiveness.
Confidentiality provisions are sometimes requested by a community itself;107
this can put future communities at a disadvantage by limiting the number of
past agreements available, thus reducing their ability to learn from the
experience of other communities.108 Efforts by researchers to comprehensively
analyse CDAs are also undermined. Knowledge of what has and what has not
worked with respect to CDAs will accordingly often be limited by one’s ability
to gain insider information from companies or other stakeholders, meaning
that any lessons learned by such information can only be published as a
secondary source, meaning that key details may be left out.
As stated above, the review of CDAs conducted for this article was limited
to those where full text documents were accessible to the public. Databases
such as that of the Agreements, Treaties, and Negotiated Settlements project
(ATNS)109 go a long way in providing access to information about agreements
and the agreements themselves, though at the time of the review, of the 1942
entries in the database, only 22 provided full text documents relating to a
specific agreement.110 More agreements can be found through internet
research, including via local government websites, but even in countries where
community agreements are legally required, only a limited number are
publicly available.
5. CONCLUSION
While an effective CDA will be adapted to local context, the broad practices
described in this article will be generally applicable across jurisdictions and
communities. A key practice is to ensure meaningful community involvement
in the agreement-making process and in decision-making regarding the project
itself, in accordance with FPIC norms and standards. This will help to ensure
that the CDA, and the agreement-making process, are responsive to the needs,
aspirations and local conditions of the community. Meaningful community

107 Comment from practitioner in the field.
108 What are Impact and Benefit Agreements? available at http://
www.miningfacts.org/Communities/What-are-Impact-and-BenefitAgreements-%28IBAs%29/.
109 Agreements, Treaties and Negotiated Settlements Project, available at: http://
www.atns.net.au.
110 Other organisations have also started collections of CDAs, for example: http:
//www.sdsg.org/archives/cda-library/.
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involvement can be facilitated by identifying all impacted stakeholders,
providing information, resources and capacity building to help foster a more
balanced playing field, and by implementing processes that involve community
members in the governance and oversight of the agreement’s implementation.
These practices should be adopted as early as possible in the process, and be
carried out through to and beyond mine closure, with the aim of ensuring the
community’s self-determined development. CDAs will be most effectively
implemented where the company builds the agreement into its business
processes and takes its obligations seriously.111 Where this is not done, the risk
of grievances and opposition from community members increases, as do the
likely financial costs to the company’s operations.
Despite the leading practices described in industry guides and policy
documents, it is difficult to find many CDAs that exhibit them. There is,
therefore, a great need for all stakeholders to work to establish more effective
CDAs, and to work towards their public disclosure. Governments should focus
on sensitising investors to the need for meaningful community engagement,
enforcing more detailed legislative requirements for CDAs and enhancing
community access to legal advisors and other support. Companies should
continue to adopt leading approaches when entering into them, including
making available sufficient funding and opportunities for communities to
prepare for negotiations. Finally, communities will be best placed to achieve
an advantageous CDA where they effectively self-organise, carry out effective
and democratic processes to identify key priorities and negotiating positions,
and demand these leading practices of companies when negotiating such
agreements.

111 Comment from practitioner in the field.

